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This paper explores the case of a sovereign indebted country facing a choice
of economic policy today that will determine the country’s ability to continue
its debt servicing in the future. If the sovereign undertakes an unsound eco-
nomic policy it will repudiate its debt with certainty; otherwise it will repudiate
its debt with some positive probability. In our framework there is no court to
enforce contracts. However, we assume the existence of a multilateral ﬁnancial
institution that could bailout the ﬁnancially troubled sovereign country. Our
focus is on the incentives created by the perspective of a bailout, as well as the
punishment that the international ﬁnancial markets could impose on the de-
faulting country, on today’s economic policy. This essay provides a theoretical
grounding for the IMF and other multilateral agencies intervention on the in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets showing that, unlike the idea that bailouts create
both debtor and creditor moral hazard, it is sometimes a result of creditors’
overreaction to the prospect of a liquidity crisis. The main result of the essay is
that the multilateral will be better oﬀ bailing out the country regardless of the
economic policy undertaken in order to avoid bigger losses from a generalized
ﬁnancial crisis.
1 Introduction
The recent debt problems in a number of developing nations, the potential
of crisis “contagion”, and the International Monetary Fund [imf] led bailout
raises, once again, several questions about the architecture of the international
ﬁnancial markets. As it is today, the international ﬁnancial markets do not
provide the necessary mechanisms to countries with unsustainable debts to
promptly and orderly resolve them. The only tool available today requires the
international community, the imf, and other multilateral ﬁnancial agencies, to
bailout the private creditors. This chapter provides a basic analytic introduc-
tion to some of the eﬀects that a bailout, or the expectation of one, has on
1the behavior of international lenders and sovereign borrowers, especially moral
hazard.
The not long past international ﬁnance history shows the extensive use of
bailout to rescue ﬁnancial distressed countries. After the $30 billion bailout
of Mexico in 1995, the occurrences of national-currency and ﬁnancial crises in
developing countries have scaled up, as the use of Fund-led bailout solution
totaled more than $250 billion.1 The most recent events are the ﬁnancial as-
sistance to Brazil (2002), and to Uruguay (2002), both countries facing capital
ﬂow as a result, mainly, of contagion from the Argentina (2001-02) debt default.
After these last bailout of sovereign economies the discussion of the eﬀectiveness
of the International Monetary Fund, the U. S. Treasure, and others multilateral
ﬁnancial agencies measures has climbed to the top of the agenda.
This article address the incentives, or lack of, an indebted country has to
adopt sound economic policies - which, in turn, may allow it continue servicing
its debt - if it expects to be bailed out by multilateral agencies once it declares
itself unable to do so. Speciﬁcally, in an asymmetric information environment
the indebted country may undertake unsound economic policies that will lead
to liquidity problems later, and it is likely to get it since a defaulting country
may export its ﬁnancial turmoil to other ldcs through a disruption in investor’s
conﬁdence.
The general situation of a sovereign government which repudiates its debts
resumes to one of the following three options: default (or disorderly debt re-
structuring), orderly restructuring the debt by negotiating directly with its
lenders, or seek bailout from international ﬁnancial institutions.
A disorderly restructuring, or default, can block a countries’ access to private
capital for years [Cole et all. [3]], result in trade reductions [Rose [14]], and
transfer of some of the debtor’s current assets within the territory subject to
the jurisdiction of the creditor’s legal system [Eaton [8]] making a bad situation
even worse. An orderly restructuring can also impose a severe cost in terms
of output declining, and devastate the domestic ﬁnancial system. As posted
by Krueger [9] an orderly restructuring can take too long as a result of the
large number syndicated banks involved, as well as the diversity of banks and
bondholders involved and the variety of debt instruments and derivatives in use.
An agreement could take forever to be reached, if reached at all, because each
creditor has an incentive to free-ride in the debt restructuring, ensuring full
recover, by letting the others reduce their claims. The third option, a bailout,
involves the imf, and other multilateral, rescuing the distressed economy by
lending enough money to make that country able to continue servicing its debt
in the short-run, buying time to implement economic adjustments, and restoring
investor conﬁdence without push another emerging indebted economies into
ﬁnancial crises as well.
Many scholars have discussed the case for imf loans to rescue troubled
economies, defend exchange rates, and restore ﬁnancial markets conﬁdence.
The analysis of ﬁnancial rescue of developing economies when default and
bailouts are possible strategies poses diﬃcult theoretical questions. The most
1The Mexico (1994-95) crises was followed by the collapse of Asian ﬁnancial systems (1997), and
Russia (1998).
2discussed are the distortion of incentives to sovereigns that will follow loose
economic policies that could eventually cause economic and ﬁnancial problems,
and the excessive risk taken by international lenders if they expect the imf to
bailout an indebted country in case of a ﬁnancial crisis.2 The main argument
suggesting that imf-led bailout is a bad idea is based on the following: (i) it
creates debtor moral hazard; (ii) it distorts the market incentives; and, ﬁnally,
(iii) it undermine superior less-expensive solutions. The arguments may be
summarized as follows:
Debtor Moral Hazard: the more a multilateral bails out countries the
more one should expect countries to slip into crises in the future. The
expectations of multilateral support and ﬁnancial assistance would reduce
incentives of a debtor country to follow sound polices in the ﬁrst place,
aﬀecting its incentives regarding payments on its external liabilities to
the foreign external lenders. Roubini [15] identify another type of debtor
moral hazard related to domestic private agents that borrow excessively
from foreign creditors, and make distorted investment decisions as a result
of governmental guarantees.
Distortion of market incentives, or creditor moral hazard: if the lenders
expect that the multilateral will bail out a sovereign indebted economy,
their lending decisions will be distorted. Since the investor losses in case
of a default are not realized as the sovereign is rescued, the investors will
undermine the credit/repayments risk, behaving more risky;
Undermine less-expensive solution: the parties involved in a sovereign
ﬁnancial crisis must engage either in debt restructuring/reduction or lit-
igation. Both alternatives involve losses such as proﬁt reduction, credi-
bility loss, and court fees, etc. However, those costs are less expensive
than the ﬁnancial markets ineﬃciency resulting of doing nothing. The
imf intervention discourages direct negotiations if it lends to the insol-
vent sovereign borrower, thus allowing it to repay its debts and making
null creditors’ risks. Without the risk of a complete loss both creditors
and debtor will not be compelled to oﬀering concessions.
On the other hand, authors like Summers [19], and Rubini [15] do not
believe that the moral hazard distortion is that important. Accordingly, they
believe it is too simplistic the idea that a sovereign government would follow
loose economic policies in order to receive imf assistance because it does not
take into account those policies high costs in terms of inﬂation, output, and
unemployment, etc. Secondly, they argue that the public in less developing
countries resist to imf support as it is seen as loss because the conditional
adjustment usually pushes tough economic policies and it is seen as a loss of
sovereignty.
Another argument in favor of bailouts is the credibility crises and contagion:
if a country experiences ﬁnancial problems and the imf support is not given,
banks and other investors would ﬂee from other emerging ﬁnancial markets.
When the lenders have not conﬁdence about being repaid they tend to move as
2The practical importance of those distortions in international capital ﬂow is stressed, among
others, by Calomiris [2], Schwartz and Dooley [4], Dooley [4], and Meltzer [12] (2000).
3quickly as they can to protect their positions. They may sell the loans before
maturity, they can decline to roll over, or extend, loans that have matured. The
contagion eﬀect is such that even the creditors willing to roll over their loans
at a higher interest rate may not do so for fear of being caught in a payment
crisis.3
We develop the idea that the pattern of default/bailout associated with
debt crises arises as part of the optimal pattern of punishment when bailouts
among ﬁnancial distressed countries are constrained by two market imperfec-
tions: moral hazard, and risk of debt service default. To generate the moral
hazard problem into the model we show that it is not time-consistent for the
imf to allow an illiquid country go bankrupt. To introduce risk of default we
assume that sovereign borrowers can at any time stop servicing their debts.4
We show through the model that potentially liquid indebted countries will
take unsound economic policies that will make them unable-to-service, or re-
pudiate, their debts in the future, as the imf will ex-post bail them out to
avoid the dead-weight loss associated with the disruption on the ﬁnancial mar-
kets stability and overall reduction on international trade. Simply put, the
imf bailout will give incentive to sovereigns’ governments to renege ﬁscal so-
briety and responsible monetary policies. The next step is to solve the moral
hazard problem by repeating the one-shot default-bailout game. Speciﬁcally,
we examine the optimal bailout strategy in an environment in which there are
many indebted countries choosing sequentially between servicing their debts
and repudiating them. If a country repudiates its debt it is punished with
loss of credibility and consequently exclusion from international markets. In
this framework, the imf has now to weight the cost of letting a country into
bankruptcy and the beneﬁt it generates in the form of deterring future debt
repudiations. The cost of bankruptcy is the same as in the one-shot game, e.g.,
reduction of international trade, court fees, and contagion. The beneﬁt now is
the debt repudiation deterred in the future, as other indebted countries won’t
repudiate their debt to avoid the punishment it may face. The optimal bailout
pattern for the imf in this environment is to follow an discretionary strategy
under which each country who repudiate its debt is not imf rescued with a
positive probability, and thus being punished through denial of access to credit
markets and trade sanctions.
1.1 The Literature on Sovereign Debt
The theoretical literature on sovereign debt is divided into two basic subsets.
The ﬁrst subset deals with problems of short-run liquidity problems, and long-
run country insolvency and policy prescription. The second one deals with
issues raised by the willingness-to-pay, notably incentives and reputation. The
3The diﬃculty that some indebted governments faced in rolling over maturing debt played,
according Samuelson [17], an important role in recent Mexico, Russia and Brazil debt crises.
4We distinguish ability-to-service from willingness-to-service the debt. A country is said to be
able-to-service if it has enough cash reserves to continue servicing its debt. Alternatively, a country
is willing-to-service if it has the cash reserves and, at the same time, wants to continue servicing
its debt. In the model we assume that if a sovereign’s government takes unsound policies ex-ante it
will imply its inability-to-service the debts in the future. Therefore, unwillingness imply inability.
4later literature, to which belong our study, is summarized by Eaton [8]. Other
comprehensive surveys can be found in Eaton et al. [7], Eaton and Fernandez [5],
and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [13], chapter 6.
Typically, the reputation approach to sovereign debt takes the lenders as
atomistic while the borrower country behaves strategically to inﬂuence the
lenders’ expectations regarding debt repayment or repudiation. The sovereign’s
debt repayment decision is looked at as an assessment of the costs and beneﬁts
of debt repudiation. The costs are the denial of future access to credit markets,
reduction on trade, and seize of the country’s assets in the creditor legal sys-
tem. The beneﬁts of repudiation is the real value of the outstanding debt. As
noted ﬁrst by Eaton and Gersovitz [6], the primary consideration in lending to
a sovereign entity should not be the liquidation of the borrower assets in case
of default, as in the case of private bankruptcy, but the expectation that the
borrower will bind the contract by devoting enough share of its future revenues.
In this sense, the literature also diﬀerentiate between country and government
debts. In the ﬁrst case, studied by Krugman ([10], [11] the country solvency
depends on the size of its outstanding debt in comparison with the net present
value of the country’s net income stream. In this case, a country whose debt
obligations are below its annual GDP is said to be solvent. On the other hand,
if most of the country’s is owed by its government, it is the government’s budget
constraint that must be considered [Sachs [16]]. Even if the country is solvent,
it might face problems to service its debt if the government does not have access
to a suﬃcient large fraction of the GDP.5
Reputational analysis considers a sovereign government issuing debt in an
way of sharing the risk associated with adverse shocks to its lenders.6 On the
other hand, it considers the lenders atomistic in the sense that each lender’s
actions are taken independently, and the only cost that the lenders can inﬂict to
the sovereign is to deny future access to capital markets. A sovereign reputation
is its past history of debt issuing and repayment used to inﬂuence lenders’
expectations regarding future debt servicing behavior. The borrowing country
looses its reputation if it repudiates its debt even if an adverse shock is not
observed, and in this case the cost of being cut oﬀ the international ﬁnancial
markets will be imposed. The threat of credit denial, or ﬁnancial autarky, is
seen in the literature [e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz [6], and Cole et all. [3]] as
an incentive for borrowers to validate lenders’ expectations for repayment and
so to maintain a creditworthy reputation. Also, the credit denial may also
aﬀect the sovereign by reduction of trade as a result of reduction of commercial
credit lines to embattled domestic exporting companies. The main result in
this literature is that the sovereign borrower will preserve its reputation, and
validate the lender’s expectations, because the cost of being not creditworthy
exceeds the beneﬁts.
5Although our article deals with the case where most of the country’s debt is owed by the
government, its conclusions can be easily extended to the reverse case.
6One interpretation is the government issuing debt to smooth consumption in the long-run.
Its issues debt to sustain the level of national consumption in periods of recession, for instance,
repaying the debt in periods of high economic growth.
51.2 Article’s relation with the literature and Outline
The literature on bailout of ﬁnancial distressed countries is relatively scarce.
Besides the fast development of a literature on sovereign debt that deals with
the issues of a country’s ability and willingness-to-pay, as well as the policy
responses to the debt crisis of the 1980s, only a few papers were devoted to
analyze the role of the imf as rewarding an illiquid country that had taken
sound economic policies and letting countries that had taken unsound ones to
be punished by the international ﬁnancial markets. Those papers, along with
their main ideas were discussed in the introduction. In this article we try to
oﬀer a formal analysis of the imf bailout decision and the implications it might
have in the actions played by the international ﬁnancial market players, notably
a borrowing country and its international lenders.
To proceed the analyze we structured the remaining of this article as fol-
lows: section 2 contains the setup of the general one-shot default-bailout game,
and the benchmark one-sovereign one-lender game; section 3 describes the The
imperfect information, many borrowers-many lenders game; section 4 analyzes
the best strategies assuming the imf can commit to an action announced ex-
ante, and formalizes the credible threat problem; section 5 describes the time-
consistent equilibrium; section 6 concludes the study.
2 The Model
2.1 General Setup
There are N risk-neutral countries, or sovereigns, who had borrowed money
in the international ﬁnancial markets. Each of those countries has an initial
endowment e, and has a future surplus whose value is y. The endowment may
be seen as the country’s foreign reserves, or even its stock of physical assets, at
the moment it contracts the debt. A country’s action space has two elements.
It may choose to undertake sound economic policies, or unsound ones. If a
country chooses unsound economic policies it will be unable to service its debt;7
otherwise, it may or may not be able to service its. On other words, if a country
undertakes sound economic policies it will service its debt with probability
Prfy+e ¸ Dg = p. On the other hand, if a country chooses unsound economic
policies it will repudiate its debt with certainty. A country’s economic policy is
private information to that country, as its ability (or inability) to pay is publicly
observed.8
A multilateral international ﬁnancial agency, or the imf, may act mitigating
the payment burden from countries which had announced liquidity problems on
one hand, and on the other it may act as representative of creditors. In the ﬁrst
case, the imf can concede a bailout and, on the other, it may use its strong-
conditionality clause to impose that country the adoption of strict ﬁscal and
7A country is said to be able-to-service its debt, or to be liquid, if its surplus plus reserves
exceeds the maturing debt service, y + e ¸ D.
8For simplicity we do not make distinction between short and long-term debt. Without loss
of generality we consider all debt as maturing in the short-term because a ﬁnancial crisis, or loss
credibility in servicing the debt in the short-term may lead to long-term default too.
6monetary policies that may generate suﬃcient surplus to ensure the payment
capacity in the near future at expense of welfare to that country’s inhabitants.
Therefore, the Fund acts as an utilitarian player, which takes into account the
costs and beneﬁts of its bailout decision for the international ﬁnancial markets
as a whole.
The bailout of a debt-repudiating country may be of an amount b >> 0 and,
by doing so, the Fund gives that country funds so that it might keep servicing its
debt. This buys some market conﬁdence regarding the debtor’s ability-to-pay
and thus reduces the creditors’ fears on a mass default. In case of conﬁdence
crisis, the investors would ﬂee from that country, declining from rolling over, or
extending, the maturing debt. This could make a country illiquid and subject
to self-fulﬁlling speculative runs and panic. The Fund’s ﬁnancial assistance
and policy conditions are linked to this self-fulﬁlling runs and panic through a
conﬁdence function q = q(b) which satisﬁes the following properties: q0 > 0,
q00 < 0, limb!Dq(b) = 1, and has a value q(b) 2 (0;1), for _b ¸ 0. Second
to later property says that the conﬁdence on the country’s ability-to-service is
not fully restored even if the bailout covers the entire country’s maturing debt,
and the latter property implies that there may not be crisis contagion if zero
bailout is granted.
The bailout is a transfer of resources from the Fund to a troubled country
for a relatively short period at an speciﬁed interest rate. The Fund cannot
print money so that its resources are limited to part of the quotas paid in by
its members and the borrowing agreements it has in place with a number of
nations. In an informal way its lending is also limited by the reluctance of the
members to see large sums of money used to bail out private creditors of that
troubled nation. Nonetheless, even so it could be the case the Fund has not
resources to bailout every troubled country at the same time, we assume that it
is able to rescue one country at a time using the repayments it receives from a
country it had rescued before. Said that, we write the imf’s budget constraint
as b = N:D.
The international ﬁnancial markets may punish countries that renege on
their debt service by cutting them oﬀ from capital ﬂows in the future. Also,
defaulting countries may suﬀer reduced beneﬁts of international trade by facing
the drying up of credit lines for domestic exporting companies, or even the
concealment of exporting contracts previously negotiated.9 If we consider the
international lenders competitive, so that each one occupies a smaller share of
the market - as sustained by Krueger [9] - than the threat of credit withdrawal
is a costless and credible sanction. Denote the size of the sanction by s.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: The indebted country privately decides between sound and unsound
economic policies. If the country undertakes sound economic policies it will
default with probability p; otherwise it will default with certainty.
9The importance of future exclusion from capital markets, disputed by Bulow and Rogoﬀ [1], is
consistent with Eaton and Gersovitz [6], and Cole et al. [3]). The later summarizes the historical
evidence on settlements. Rose (2001) ﬁnds evidence that sovereign default is associated with a
decline in bilateral trade.
7Stage 2: The country publicly announces its ability (or inability) to service its
debt;
Stage 3: The IMF publicly announce a bailout size b 2 [0;D], where b = 0
means it has choose not to bailout an unable-to-pay country;
Stage 4: The lenders in the international ﬁnancial market apply a sanction
s 2 [s;s] to any defaulting country;
Stage 5: Payoﬀ and Outcome are realized.
Before we proceed the analyze of the game above we establish a bench-
mark model assuming the existence of only one country whose economic policy
character is publicly observed, and only one lender.
2.2 The benchmark public information, one borrower-one
lender game
Consider the case where a country has only one foreign lender which can impose
a sanction to the defaulting country. Assume by sake of argument that this
sanction will be collected with certainty. Assume also that the sanction cannot
be higher than the outstanding debt, or s 2 f0;D ¡ y ¡ e ¡ bg. In a perfect
information framework, the benchmark-game timing is as follows:
Stage 1: The indebted country decides between sound and unsound economic
policies. If the country undertakes sound economic policies it will default with
probability p; otherwise it will default with certainty;
Stage 2: The IMF chooses to bailout or not a defaulting country, and the
bailout size b 2 [0;D];
Stage 3: The lender imposes a sanction s 2 [0;D¡y¡e¡b] to the defaulting
country;
In the third stage of the game, the lender will choose the highest sanction
possible s¤ = D ¡ y ¡ e ¡ b, independent of the country’s choice of economic
policy, and the imf’s bailout choice.
In the second stage, the imf chooses the bailout size to maximize his payoﬀ
after observe the country’s default, and taking as given the lender sanction.
If the country has defaulted, it doesn’t matter which economic policy it had
undertaken, the imf’s bailout will be on the size of the outstanding debt b¤ =
D ¡ y ¡ e.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the indebted country must choose its economic
policy. Knowing it will be bailout by the imf if it is illiquid, the country will
decide between sound and unsound policies based on its expectations p, and
q(D ¡ y ¡ e). If p > q(D ¡ y ¡ e), then sound policies will be undertaken;
otherwise, if p < q(D ¡ y ¡ e) than loose economic policies will be on the
agenda.
Finally, note that since q0 > 0, higher the bailout is, higher is the lender’s
conﬁdence. Since a more conﬁdent lender will be less likely to punish the
contract breaching country, by increasing the bailout size the imf makes the
country willing to follow loose economic policies. The following proposition
summarizes the result:
8Proposition 1 (Debtor Moral Hazard) Let s = D ¡ y ¡ e, p 2 (0;1);and
b 2 [0;D]. Then there is an ˜ b such that, for every b > ˜ b, p < q(b) and the
indebted country will undertake unsound economic policies.
Corollary 1 Given the result in Proposition 1, it is easy to see that a country
has incentive to borrow to much. Moreover, since the lender will receive the
payment for sure, it will accept to lend to much.
3 The imperfect information, many borrowers-
many lenders game
In this section we provide the analysis for the game with many indebted coun-
tries, and many international lenders described in section 2.1. According to
that setup the countries are indexed by the level of sanctions s they expect to
face in case of debt repudiation, where s is continuously distributed according
to the distribution function, f(s), deﬁned in the interval [s;s]. f(s) is assumed
to be public information. The sanction s, which we call market sanction is thus
a sum of many individuals lenders actions against one sovereign such that it is
now a random variable.10
After a country defaults a dead-weight loss k is imposed to the ﬁnancial
markets as a result of a conﬁdence crisis and contagion. This dead-weight cost
includes the loss the world economy has in the form of decline in trade, crisis
contagion, increase in the world interest rates, and court and bankruptcies
procedures costs to enforce the broken contracts.11 Assume that k is the same
for every defaulting countries.
We can now write down a country’s expected payoﬀ for each kind of eco-
nomic policy it chooses as function of its debt burden, the size of the bailout,
and the market sanction. Accordingly, the expected payoﬀ of country which
undertakes unsound economic policies may be written as:
ΠU(D;b;s) = q(b)[y + e ¡ D + b] + (1 ¡ q(b))[y + e ¡ D + b ¡ s]
Substituting the imf’s relief budget constraint, the expected payoﬀ may be
rewritten as:
ΠU(b;s) = q(b)[y + e + (1 ¡
1
N





ΠU(b;s) = y + e + (1 ¡
1
N
)b ¡ (1 ¡ q(b))s (1)
10If we denote the set of lenders by L, with typical element l, then s =
P
l2L sl. Finally, assume
that if the lender l imposes a sanction sl, this lender will collect some amount ®sl, for ® 2 (0;1),
i.e., a sanction sl is no necessarily a fee paid to l.
11To overcome a crisis a country must increase the size of its reserves. To do that the country
try to built a trade surplus by increasing its exports and decreasing its imports. Because it is not
easy to increase exports in the short-run countries rely on cutting income and inducing a major
recession. Obviously, each country imports are other exports so a troubled country downturn is
exported around its region. Stiglitz [18] calls this beggar-thy-neighbor policies because the downturn
is achieved at the country’s neighbor expenses. Obviously a loss to the world economy.
9The expected payoﬀ to a country with sound economic policies is given by:
ΠS(D;b;s) = p[y + e ¡ D] + (1 ¡ p)[y + e ¡ D + b ¡ (1 ¡ q(b))s]
where p ´ Prfy + e ¸ Dg. Also substituting the Fund’s budget constraint we
have:
ΠS(b;s) = p[y + e ¡
b
N
] + (1 ¡ p)[y + e ¡
b
N
+ b ¡ (1 ¡ q(b))s]
or
ΠS(b;s) = y + e ¡
1
N
b + (1 ¡ p)[b ¡ (1 ¡ q(b))s] (2)
A country’s choice of economic policy is thus summarized by its payoﬀ
function. Since both ΠU and ΠS are decreasing in the sanction s, but at
diﬀerent rates so that the population of countries will divide itself between those
for whom ΠU > ΠS will undertake unsound economic policies, and vice versa.
It is useful to identify the marginal country who is just indiﬀerent between tight
and loose policies. This country has s denoted by ˜ s deﬁned by ΠU = ΠS or,
from (2) and (1), by
b ¡ q(b)˜ s = 0 (3)
That is, for the marginal individual, the beneﬁt from unsound economic policies
and getting the bailout b just equals the expected sanction given the credibility
the imf lends through the bailout. Any country with s < ˜ s will default with
certainty while any with s > ˜ s will default only with probability p.
4 The Optimal Ex-Ante Bailout Strategy and
the Credible Threat Problem
4.1 The optimal bailout strategy when the Fund can com-
mit
In this section the imf ﬁrst anticipates the countries’ behavior and, based on
those, it takes all its decisions. The countries then decide whether to default
or not, taking as given the Fund’s announced policies regarding ﬁnancial assis-
tance. As argued before, the imf’s objective is to ensure the stability of the
ﬁnancial markets and, at the same time, guarantee liquidity of its members.
Assuming that the Fund chooses the whether to bailout or not, and the size














The ﬁrst-best outcome would have all countries choosing sound policies and,
therefore every sovereign default should be triggered by a random shock whose
10probability is (1 ¡ p). All debt repudiating countries are punished, and the
Fund bails them out.12
Note that if the sanctions are suﬃciently high comparatively to the bailout,
it is possible to discourage all unsound policies. Interestingly, if the policymak-
ers do expect their country to be punished at the maximal extent, they would
adopt sound economic policies at the ﬁrst place and thus the default would
be avoided with probability p. Therefore, the best outcome for the Fund, as
well as the world economy, would be the one where no unsound policies will
be taken, sovereign default is reduced to a minimum. In this best outcome the
s-type country chooses sound economic policies and, if this country is better
oﬀ by doing so clearly every other s > s is also better oﬀ sticking to a debt
service strategy. To see this pick a vector (b;s) >> 0 such that a given s-type
sovereign takes sound policies. If we decrease s to s, we can also decrease b to b
(3), say b, so that s also sticks with sound policies. But if b is not high enough
to make s willing to repudiate its debt, clearly b is not high enough to make
any other country s > s willing to repudiate too.
Proposition 2 (Minimal Bailout) If the bailout is small enough, i.e., _b ·
b, where b solves (3) for s = s, than no unsound policies will be observed in
equilibrium regardless of the sanction.
On the other hand, if the market sanctions are too high, than the imf
would be wiling to renege its ex-ante strategy and oﬀer a bailout to a troubled
country. In other words, if both the imf, and the countries expect a sanction
level which is higher than s, say Es =
R s
s xf(x)dx, than some countries will
default by choosing unsound policies. In this case, the imf will be better oﬀ be
reneging its minimal bailout strategy. This occurs because bailout is applied
after default is eminent, but before sanctions are applied. So, if default is
eminent, the imf will be better oﬀ by bailing out any illiquid country before
sanctions are realized.
4.2 The Credible Threat Problem
We have seen that the expectation of bailout will generate more default, as a
sovereign country expects to beneﬁt from imf money transfer. In order to avoid
the moral hazard problem, the imf can commit to a minimal debt relief of a debt
repudiating country. Hence, if the imf is able to commit to a minimal bailout
, i.e., set b = b ex-ante, no unsound policies will be taken, fewer countries will
default, and all default veriﬁed will the result of a random shock. The credible
threat problem arises from the fact that whether an ex-ante announced decision
of not debt relieving will be, in fact, ex-post implemented. The key factor for
the analysis is now the dead-weight cost created by a sovereign debt repudiation.
The ex-ante optimal sanction outcome is sustainable only if the countries
believe that the minimal bailout b will be ex-post imposed along with a positive
sanction. It is easy to see, however, that this result is not sustainable ex-post.
12If, for instance, the imf was in control of the sanctions, the ﬁrst best outcome would have zero
sanctions and a zero bailout, with every country adopting sound policies, and those with ex-post
liquidity problems being granted a debt forgiveness equal to D ¡ (y + e).
11By diﬀerentiating [4] with respect to the sanction s, and assuming an interior
ˆ s we get
¡N[(1 ¡ q(b)F(ˆ s) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ q(b)(1 ¡ F(ˆ s))] < 0 (5)
If the countries are rational, they will recognize that the imf will not stick to
its announced minimal bailout if ˆ s > s. This is because given ˆ s, the Fund will
be better oﬀ increasing the bailout ex-post. So, every s-type sovereign so that
s < s < ˆ s will still prefer to undertake unsound economic policies when the
Fund is not able to commit on b.
Proposition 3 (Debtor Moral Hazard 2) If the imf is not able to commit
to a ﬁxed minimal bailout level b, as deﬁned in the Proposition 2, than every
country type s, where s < s < ˆ s, will undertake unsound economic policies and
default with probability one.
The intuition is that once a sovereign has defaulted the cost associated with
this action is borne by the world economy. The imf then sees this as a sunk
cost and doesn’t take it into account when taking his bailout decision. More
than that, the imf does not control the sanction, which is imposed by the
market institutions when they run from the debt-repudiating country in order
to protect their positions. Since the Fund acts like an utilitarian institution, it
will be better oﬀ by oﬀering the defaulting country ﬁnancial assistance to avoid
both the sanctions which will be imposed anyway, and the sunk cost associated
with the contagion eﬀect. The rational indebted countries will realize that,
undertake unsound economic policies and repudiate its debt in the interim
stage of the game.
5 The Time-Consistent Equilibria
If the imf cannot commit to a minimal ﬁnancial assistance to a defaulting
country, neither cannot guarantee that the optimal ex-ante sanction will be
applied, then the sovereign rationally anticipates that the Fund will revise its
policies ex-post. Clearly, the imf cannot commit with non-assistance, or zero
bailout because, once a country had defaulted, the Fund would be better oﬀ
conceding to avoid the dead-weight loss of contagion, court costs, and declining
in the international trade. Regarding the ex-ante optimal sanction, it is not
the imf who ultimately decides on its size, but only can reduce its eﬀects by
generating market conﬁdence. As such, given the decentralized character of
the market decisions the size of the sanction is uncertain. For our analysis, if
suﬃces to observe that the sanction is exogenous from the imf’s view point.
Given this not commitment framework, the order of plays are now reversed,
i.e, the countries will decide their economic policy and announce liquidity prob-
lems or not ﬁrst and, only after that, the Fund will decide between bailout or
not after observe the countries move. Since the amount of sanction applicable
afterwards is set by the international ﬁnancial markets, not by the Fund, we
shall consider the case where the imf revises only the amount of the ﬁnancial
assistance. Furthermore, note that the imf acts like a Stackelberg follower to
12the sovereign, so that the Fund’s action has no deterrent eﬀect in this context.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium in an environment without commitment we proceed by
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N)b + (1 ¡ p)(b ¡ (1 ¡ q(b))x)]f(x)dx
¾
(6)
where ˆ s is a ﬁxed number since the sovereigns’ have already been made. The
ﬁrst-order condition for the imf non-commitment problem (6) is:
¡1 + N ¡ Np + NpF(ˆ s + Nsq0(b¤)[1 ¡ p + pF(ˆ s)] = 0 (7)
which implicitly deﬁnes the Fund’s best response to the countries’ economic
policy decision, F(ˆ s). The Fund’s best response is a positive bailout if, and
only if
1 ¡ N(1 ¡ p(1 ¡ F(ˆ s)) > 0
or
s < F ¡1(1 +
1 ¡ N
pN
) := ˆ s (8)
This expression gives us the s-type of the indiﬀerent sovereign. According to (7),
the Fund will bailout every sovereign type s < ˆ s, and the rational sovereign cor-
rectly anticipate that and choose unsound economic policies, and are sanctioned
(1¡q(b¤)s. The other type of sovereign will choose sound policies, default with
probability p, not be bailout, and be punished with sanction (1¡p)(1¡q(0))s.
Note that this equilibrium exists if, and only if, at least a minimal number
of countries had taken sound policies, or 1¡F(ˆ s) < N¡1
pN , and at least a fraction
p > N¡1
N of the countries who took sound economic policies are liquid. This will
ensure that the imf has enough cash reserves to rescue all s < ˆ s type countries.
Proposition 4 (The Time Consistent Equilibrium)
(i) If 1¡F(ˆ s) < N¡1
pN , and p > N¡1
N , then every sovereign for whom s < ˆ s will
take unsound policies, as those for whom s ¸ ˆ s will take sound policies, and
the imf will spend b¤ > 0 given by (7) bailing out every defaulting country.
(ii) Otherwise, all countries take sound economic policies, and the imf spends
zero in bailout.
Interestingly, we have shown the co-existence of a positive bailout and un-
sound economic policies proving that the Fund’s bailout indeed generates debt
moral hazard. Note, however that we don’t address social welfare issues. This
could be the ﬁrst extension for this analysis. By measuring the social welfare
one can verify if the debtor moral hazard is a bad thing. It might not.
Finally, in this simple model when the Fund cannot commit, we no obtain
minimal bailout. Indeed, under certain conditions we ﬁnd the opposite extreme
case of maximal bailout. In this case the imf spends all its revenues in bailouts.
13This extreme case has arisen because of the fact that we have considered only
a one-shot model. In fact, in the real world debt servicing, or repudiation,
are continuously being committed and sanctions continuously being imposed.
In such a setting, one might expect that a sovereign might be able to build a
reputation for undertaking sound policies. This is another possible extension.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this essay we study the debtor/creditor relationship in an environment where
no legal framework exists for the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. This is the
situation under which sovereign countries borrow from international ﬁnancial
institutions, and are not subject to bankruptcy procedures as those present on
most of the western economies bankruptcy code. The only tool available to
regulate the international ﬁnancial market is ﬁnancial rescue oﬀered by inter-
national multilateral agencies such as the imf, the Paris’ Club, and the World
Bank.
Our analysis characterizes how potential bailout of a sovereign country’s
debt impacts this country economic performance. If no bailout exists, the
country must undertake an ex ante sound economic policy, and sovereign debt
default is reduced to a minimal level. This happens because the international
lenders will punish a defaulting country through reduction in international
trade, foreign direct investment, and credit. If bailout is a clear possibility,
then an incentive to some countries to undertake unsound economic policies is
created; a country subject to a low level of market sanctions will have a net
gain since the bail out oﬀsets the sanctions, while a country highly susceptible
to the sanctions will have a net loss.
Given the existence of negative externalities in the international ﬁnancial
markets in the form of crisis contagion, if a country experiences ﬁnancial prob-
lems and defaults on its debt payments, banks and other creditors will ﬂee from
other emerging market economies as well. Furthermore, the sanctions imposed
to a defaulting country also aﬀects the punishers and non-defaulting countries
since both loose from the reduction on international trade and investment op-
portunities. The dead-weight loss associated with default and contagion, plus
the loss of welfare resulting from trade cut oﬀ give enough justiﬁcation for some
intervention in the international ﬁnancial markets.
This essay provides a theoretical grounding for the imf and other multi-
lateral agencies intervention on the international ﬁnancial markets. It shows
that, unlike a common idea that the existence of bail outs creates both debtor
and creditor moral hazard, it is a consequence of the sometimes “irrational”
creditors’ behavior: ﬂeeing from other emerging economies, which are not ﬁ-
nancially distressed. These self-fulﬁlling runs would generate more crisis and
higher losses.
Finally, since even a country with a sound economic policy would default
as a result of some exogenous factor the imf and other multilateral agencies
should act to avoid a sequence of defaults that could be triggered a single
ﬁnancially distressed country. The today’s architecture of the international
ﬁnancial markets have only one tool available, which is the private creditors’
14bail out.
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